War risk is a deliberate act of violence increasingly centred on ownership and management structures. The Houthi threat during the Red Sea Crisis created the impression that any vessel could have been attacked, yet Houthi operations focused on affiliations with Israel and later the US and UK. Triggers also included charters, stock exchange listings or minority shareholders. Approximately 90% of attacks involved vessels aligned with the Houthi target profile at the time of the attack, and a further 9% involved publicly available out-of-date information. The remaining 1% were misidentifications, at times due to similarity with the intended target. Likely targets were therefore identifiable before transiting the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
Targeting based on ownership structure is established practice. Iran has applied this approach for years, including against Israeli shipping, US tankers or oil shipments, and companies or nationalities connected to US sanctions enforcement. False information has a higher likelihood of leading to physical damage under long-range attacks, while close-range incidents may be concluded with limited disruption once true ownership details are confirmed.
Alleged interference with subsea infrastructure in the Baltic and North Sea during the Russia-Ukraine war has involved sanctioned and unsanctioned vessels with Russian, Chinese, or opaque ownership. Tensions between NATO and Russia remain elevated, creating conditions for further escalation below open conflict that could affect merchant shipping.
China-US tariffs on vessels of their respective merchant fleets calling at each other’s ports: the definition of “US” and “Chinese” vessels would have been central had the tariffs remained in force.
For other threats, ownership structures may indicate risk. Several vessels have been damaged outside Lloyd’s Joint War Risk Committee Listed Areas in recent years. Limpet mine cases are assessed as linked to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, with the export of Russian crude and petroleum products considered a factor. Ownership structures can therefore provide insight into risk levels beyond recent port calls to Russia.
Affiliations can also constitute mitigating factors. Identifying these factors, threat actor by threat actor, is central to determining risk.
Maritime insurers can conduct asset screening to identify affiliations with current and potential target profiles, enabling the management of aggregate exposure. Understanding these indicators allows insurers to take calculated risks while avoiding high-risk engagements. This can be reviewed during annual renewals, new purchases, or charter party agreements, with provisions for regular review as threat pictures evolve to mitigate unanticipated exposures.
