NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) Maritime Security Symposium took place on 24 November 2022 in London for the first time since 2019 due to COVID disruptions.
Numerous attendees representing NATO forces and shipping professional representatives gathered for a full day to consider the most significant recent and practical geopolitical risks which impact the shipping community’s navigation security.
The NATO MARCOM seminar was an opportunity to present NATO’s structure and means of reinforcing maritime security and counter-terrorism measures to the benefit of its member states. Further developments addressed NATO’s experience handling cyber maritime threats as an increasing problem for shipping and transport activities and how to avoid them. This topic was further developed by two well-known services providers to the industry, NORMA and MANDIANTS, who both described from different angles the format of such cyber risks and how attacks could seriously disrupt a shipowner’s commercial organisation, affect their assets and engage their liabilities.
Various ongoing geopolitical situations were analysed, and the audience gave further input relating to their own experience in those areas and issues met throughout their operations.
The conference touched upon the war in Ukraine and its practical consequences for shipowners and crew who had been working in and around Ukrainian ports since the outbreak of the war.
The BIMCO presentation focussed on the unprecedented situation created by the conflict for owners of stranded vessels, crew and cargoes. The situation linked to the grain corridor, which allowed one-third of the ships, which had been stopped to sail from and leave the area, was also highlighted. NATO’s general observation was that Russia had slightly reduced its marine military capacity and mine-laying capabilities since the Ukrainian forces had regained control of Snake Island and the sinking of MOSKVA. However, the grain corridor, which was recently extended for a further period of 120 days, remained an easy target for them.
Painting a broader picture, the Russian navy was described as being extremely powerful, with impressive equipment available in the Black Sea. Such a presence could be activated at any time to influence the course of the war.
Further considerations were also made regarding the energy and power infrastructure, onshore and offshore, which had become military targets both in and outside Ukraine.
Several comments were also related to other insecure maritime areas, such as the Gulf of Guinea (GOG) and Yemen’s adjacent waters, where the freedom of trade principle is being violated.
The threat level against the GOG maritime area was largely considered moderate due to not a single vessel attack taking place in 2022. Such a positive evolution did not mean that the crisis had disappeared, however. Especially when political and economic factors could cause a return of piracy and violence against the Nigerian oil sea trade. Complex issues and legal matters could also be consequential and result in difficult relations between owners and local authorities in managing safe processes for ships entering those areas.